Abstract-We consider the problem of revealing/sharing data in an efficient and secure way via a compact representation. The representation should ensure reliable reconstruction of the desired features/attributes while still preserve privacy of the secret parts of the data. The problem is formulated as a remote lossy source coding with a privacy constraint where the remote source consists of public and secret parts. Inner and outer bounds for the optimal tradeoff region of compression rate, distortion, and privacy leakage rate are given and shown to coincide for some special cases. When specializing the distortion measure to a logarithmic loss function, the resulting rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff for the case of identical side information forms an optimization problem which corresponds to the "secure" version of the so-called information bottleneck.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prominence of the Internet and the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), significant amount of data are being generated, stored, and exchanged over the networks. Proper data management has become one of the most important and challenging aspects in system design. Information contained in the data are usually valuable resources that can be harnessed. However, the extensive use of data incurs some privacy risks especially when sensitive information is involved. The ultimate goal is to utilize the data to its full extent while still preserving privacy of the sensitive information.
Sankar et al. [1] and du Pin Calmon and Fawaz [2] studied the utility-privacy tradeoff from an information theoretic perspective, by relating to the framework of secure lossy source coding [3] - [8] . Inspired by these works, we consider a problem of secure remote source coding where the remote source consists of public and secret parts (hidden information associated with the data). The legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are assumed to have access to the compact representation of the data as well as separate side information. The goal is to extract public attribute/feature of the data at the legitimate receiver from the compact representation satisfying a distortion criterion, while ensuring a low amount of information leakage of secret attribute/feature of the data to the eavesdropper. Similarly as in [1] , we capture utility of the data by the reconstruction distortion of the public part at the legitimate receiver, and capture the privacy leakage by the normalized mutual information between the secret part and the eavesdropper observation. The compression rate is also considered as a practical constraint on limited storage. We wish to characterize the optimal tradeoff region of the compression rate, incurred distortion, and privacy leakage rate. In this work, inner and outer bounds to the optimal tradeoff are given and shown to be tight for some special cases. The results can be relevant for data sharing scenarios with (external)
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Eaves. attacks on sensitive information. In the same spirit as how the the rate-distortion theorem under logarithmic loss [9] - [11] is related to the information bottleneck problem [12] , in this work, the rate-distortionprivacy leakage tradeoff under logarithmic loss distortion corresponds to the secure version of information bottleneck. It extends the information bottleneck by including the privacy constraint or alternatively it extends the dual privacy funnel problem [11] by including the compression rate constraint. The secure remote source coding problem under logarithmic loss distortion therefore gives an operational meaning to the secure information bottleneck problem.
Our problem is closely related to works on lossy source coding with a privacy constraint, e.g, [3] , [4] , [7] , [13] , [1] and [14] . Especially, [1] and [14] considered one-way and interactive data sharing where the source consists of public and private parts and characterized the set of achievable distortionleakage pairs. The main differences of our work from [1] are the presence of an eavesdropper with correlated side information and the fact that public and private information are considered as remote sources.
II. SECURE REMOTE SOURCE CODING

A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a secure remote source coding shown in Fig. 1 . Source and side information alphabets,
be n-length sequences which have i.i.d. components distributed according to some fixed distribution P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z .
The sequence X n represents the data to be revealed or shared. Public and secret attributes/features associated with the data (but not accessible/allowed to be processed directly) are represented by Y n p and Y n s , respectively. The rate-limited description W is generated based on X n . The decoder reconstructs the public attribute of the data based on W and correlated side information Y n . For generality, we consider an eavesdropper which has access to the (publicly) stored description and another correlated side information Z n . The secure remote source coding should ensure the reconstruction quality of the public attribute within a prescribed distortion, and at the same time preserve privacy of the secret part by limiting the amount of information leakage rate at the eavesdropper
We note that if Z = Y , the problem reduces to the case where we impose a privacy constraint against the legitimate receiver.
Let d : R × R → [0, ∞) be a distortion measure. The distortion between Y n p and its reconstructionŶ n p is defined as
We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff of the compression rate, average distortion at the legitimate decoder, and information leakage rate at the eavesdropper.
Definition 1: A (|W (n) |, n)-code for secure remote source coding consists of
+ is said to be achievable if, for any δ > 0 there exists a sequence of (|W (n) |, n)-codes such that, for all sufficiently large n,
where W = f (n) (X n ). The rate-distortion-leakage region R is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable tuples. ♦
B. Results
Theorem 1 (Inner bound): An inner bound to the ratedistortion-leakage region R in is given as a set of all tuples
for some P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P V |X P U|V and g : V × Y →Ŷ p with |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and
The proof is based on a random coding argument where the achievable scheme follows the layered (superposition) coding with binning in [7] . The main difference lies in the analysis of achievable leakage rate which is outlined in the appendix. For the detailed proof, we refer the readers to the extended version [15] .
Remark 1: The constraint in (6) can be rewritten as
in which the terms on the right-hand side may be interpreted as follows. The term I(X, Y s ; U, V, Y ) corresponds to the leakage of (X, Y s ) through the description which depends on the remaining uncertainty at the decoder (which in this case can decode (U, V ) and knows Y ). The terms I(Z; X, Y s |U ) − I(Y ; X, Y s |U ) is the additional leakage of (X, Y s ) through the difference of side information available at the eavesdropper and decoder given that the codeword U can be decoded at the eavesdropper. Since we are only interested in the leakage of Y s , the remaining terms correspond to the leakage reduction of X that is "orthogonal" to that of Y s . The layered coding here provides some degree of freedom to optimize achievable leakage rate for our general setting. ♦ Next we provide an outer bound to the rate-distortionleakage region.
Theorem 2 (Outer bound): An outer bound to the ratedistortion-leakage region R out is given as a set of all tuples (R, D, L) ∈ R 3 + satisfying (4), (5), and
for some P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P T,V |X P U|V and g :
The proof is based on standard properties of the entropy function and the Csiszar's sum identity [16] . Due to space constraint, it is referred to the extended version [15] .
Remark 2: The results in Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended to a scenario where the sequences (X n , Y n p , Y n s ) are available directly at the encoder. In this case, we can replace X by (X, Y p , Y s ) in Theorems 1 and 2, and the joint distributions become those of the forms P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P V |X,Yp,Ys P U|V and P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P T,V |X,Yp,Ys P U|V , respectively. Theorems 1 and 2 can also be generalized to the case where Y p and Y s are not "disjoint," i.e., they share some common part. For instance, the decoder may wish to reconstruct some attributes associated with the data that are considered as secret to the eavesdropper. We simply modify the setup by replacing
where Y c acts as a common part that is supposed to be reconstructed at the decoder and protected against the eavesdropper. Theorems 1 and 2 continue to hold with Y p replaced by (Y p , Y c ) and Y s replaced by (Y s , Y c ) and the joint distribution of relevant source and side information is given by P X,Yp,Ys,Yc,Y,Z .
♦ We see that inner and outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 do not match in general. In particular, there is a gap between the leakage rate bounds. The difficulty of proving the tight bound lies in the complex dependency of information available at the eavesdropper and the secret remote source Y n s . Nevertheless, there exist some special cases where the bounds are tight.
Corollary 1: For the sources and side information whose joint distributions satisfy I(X; Y s , Z|Y ) = 0, the ratedistortion-leakage region R is given as a set of all tuples (R, D, L) ∈ R 3 + satisfying (4), (5) , and L ≥ I(Y s ; Z) for some P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P V |X and g : V × Y →Ŷ p with |V| ≤ |X | + 1.
Interestingly, in this case, the only leakage of Y n s is from correlated side information Z n . There is no additional leakage 
The proof follows from specializing Theorems 1 and 2 to the case where X − Y − (Y s , Z) forms a Markov chain, where in achievability, we choose U = ∅.
Corollary 2: For the sources and side information whose joint distributions satisfy I(X; Y |Y s , Z) = 0, the ratedistortion-leakage region R is given as a set of all tuples (R, D, L) ∈ R 3 + satisfying (4), (5), and
for some P X,Yp,Ys,Y,Z P V |X P U|V and g : V × Y →Ŷ p with |U| ≤ |X | + 3 and |V| ≤ (|X | + 3)(|X | + 2). Proof: The achievability proof follows directly from Theorem 1 with I(X; Y |Y s , Z) = 0, while the converse follows from Theorem 2 and the fact that I(X; Y |T, Y s , Z) ≥ 0.
Remark 3: Corollaries 1 and 2 hold also for the case of stochastic encoder where the description W is randomly generated according to a conditional PMF p(w|x n ). This follows from the proof of Theorem 2 where we do not make any assumption regarding the deterministic encoding mapping. ♦ Remark 4: We see that the rate-distortion-leakage region is known for several classes of sources and side information, e.g., those satisfying I(X; Y |Y s , Z) = 0 in Corollary 2. The result in Corollary 2 also recovers several existing results in the secure lossy source coding literature, e.g.,
• when Y = Z, we may think of the privacy leakage constraint as one imposed at the legitimate decoder. If X = (Y p , Y s ), Corollary 2 recovers the result of the utility-privacy tradeoff with side information in [1] . Furthermore, if X = (Y p , Y s ) and Y = Z = ∅, Corollary 2 recovers the result in [3] .
• when X = Y p = Y s , Corollary 2 recovers the result of secure lossy source coding problem studied in [7] .
• when Y = Y s , the leakage term becomes I(Y n s ; W, Z n ) which is of the same type as the side information privacy considered in [13] . The main difference is that in [13] side information privacy is considered at the secondary receiver who observes no additional side information. If the reconstruction constraint at the secondary receiver is neglected, then zero leakage rate is achievable by the Wyner-Ziv coding [17] . Interestingly, in our case where the eavesdropper has access to the additional side information, the layered random binning scheme turns out to be optimal. An achievable leakage rate in this case is I(Y s ; U, Z) + I(V ; Z|Y s , U ) which is larger than I(Y s ; Z). This is due to the fact that conditioned on Z n , the Wyner-Ziv bin indices are still correlated with side information Y n s , and thus revealing some information about Y n s to the eavesdropper. ♦ Corollary 3: When we set Y p = X and consider a lossless reconstruction of X n at the decoder, an inner bound to the rate-leakage region is given by the set of all (R,
for some P X,Ys,Y,Z P U|X with |U| ≤ |X |.
The inner bound above can be proved similarly as in Theorem 1. In fact, it can be obtained from Theorem 1 by setting Y p = X = V .
Remark 5: We note that the special case of lossless reconstruction above was considered recently in [18] where an inner bound to the rate-equivocation region is provided. In general, the results in Corollary 3 and [18, Theorem 3] do not match.
As an example where Y = Y s and Z = ∅, it can be shown that Corollary 3 implies that zero leakage rate is achievable (by choosing U = ∅). However, the achievable leakage rate according to [18, Theorem 3] can be strictly positive. ♦
C. Quadratic Gaussian Example
We consider an example of the tradeoff in Corollary 2 for Gaussian sources under quadratic distortion. Assuming that
Note that X − Y s − Y p forms a Markov chain. Also, we assume that there is no side information, i.e., Y = Z = ∅.
The tradeoff region in Corollary 2 reduces to the set of all
for D > N p . While our main results were proven for discrete memoryless sources, the extension to the quadratic Gaussian case is standard and it follows, e.g., [16] . For achievability, we set U = ∅, choose V to be jointly Gaussian with X, i.e., V = X + Q, Q ∼ N (0, N q ), and choose the reconstruction function g(·) to be an MMSE estimate of Y p given V .
and substituting it into the constraints on R and L, we obtain the result above. The converse follows from utilizing the EPI [16] together with the fact that R and L are decreasing in h(X n |W ) and h(Y n s |W ), respectively. For the more detailed proof, we refer the readers to the extended version [15] .
From (9) and (10), we can also write the minimum distortion as a function of R and L, i.e.,
For a fixed R, the minimum distortion D min decreases with L, illustrating the utility-privacy tradeoff in terms of minimum achievable distortion and information leakage rate.
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III. LOGARITHMIC LOSS DISTORTION
Logarithmic loss [9] , [10] is a measure of quality of the "soft" estimate used in several applications. Under logarithmic loss, we employ a soft estimate of the source in terms of a probability distribution over the source alphabet. For a sequenceX n ∈X n , we denoteX i , i = 1, . . . , n, the i th element ofX n . ThenX i , i = 1, . . . , n is a probability distribution on X , i.e.,X i : X → [0, 1], andX i (x) is a probability distribution on X evaluated for the outcome x ∈ X .
Definition 3 (Logarithmic loss [10] ): The logarithmic loss distortion is defined as d(x,x) = log( 1 x(x) ). Using this definition for symbol-wise distortion, it is standard to define the distortion between sequences as
. Under logarithmic loss, the average distortion and conditional entropy (equivocation at decoder) are closely related (see, e.g., Lemma 1 [10] ). This is reminiscent of what is known e.g., for the Gaussian settings under quadratic distortion.
Lemma 1: Let C = (W, Y n ) be the argument of the reconstruction function g (n) (·), i.e.,X n = g (n) (C), then under the logarithmic loss distortion measure, we get
The proof follows from definition of logarithmic loss, i.e.,
where q is a probability measure on X . Then the expected distortion conditioned on C = c,
H(X i |C = c).
Corollary 4:
Consider the privacy-constrained remote source coding in Fig. 1 . When the decoder and eavesdropper observe identical side information, i.e., Y = Z (can be seen as privacy leakage against the legitimate receiver), the rate-distortion-leakage region under logarithmic loss is given as a set of all
for some P X,Y,Yp,Ys P V |X , with |V| ≤ |X | + 2.
Proof: For achievability, we apply Corollary 2 under logarithmic loss distortion with Y = Z. We choose g(·) to be a conditional probability distribution on Y p , i.e., g(v, y) = p(y p |v, y) which gives
The converse follows by setting V i = (W, Y n\i ) and applying Lemma 1 which gives
A. Secure Information Bottleneck
Based on Corollary 4, we can formulate an optimization problem where for a given P X,Y,Yp,Ys , we wish to minimize the rate I(X; V |Y ) over all P V |X subject to the constraints on the distortion and information leakage, i.e.,
where in (15) , the distortion constraint is rewritten as the "information" constraint with
The minimum above corresponds to the minimum achievable rate for fixed D ′ and L and may be termed as the rate-information-leakage function R min (D ′ , L). We can see that the optimization problem is not convex, e.g., I(Y p ; V, Y ) is a convex function in P V |X for a fixed P X,Y,Yp,Ys . Interestingly, the problem shares some similarity with the information bottleneck problem [12] where in our case there is an additional constraint on the privacy leakage rate (16) and the presence of side information Y . Given that some side information Y is known beforehand, the goal here is to represent the data X efficiently by a compact representation V , while maximizing the relevance of V on the public attribute Y p and minimizing the relevance of V on the secret attribute Y s . Due to the additional constraint on the privacy leakage rate, we term this optimization problem as secure information bottleneck. When Y = ∅, it also corresponds to a variant of information bottleneck considered in [19] . The secure remote source coding problem under logarithmic loss distortion therefore gives an operational meaning to the secure information bottleneck.
To solve the secure information bottleneck problem, we may extend the iterative algorithm proposed in [12] , [19] or the agglomerative information bottleneck algorithm [20] , [11] to include a privacy leakage constraint. The algorithms converge to a stationary point which may not be the global optimum.
B. Example
The secure information bottleneck may alternatively be formulated as
for which the maximum in (17) corresponds to the maximum achievable information for given R and L and may be termed as the information-rate-leakage function D The achievability proof follows by letting V be an output of a BSC with input X. Then letting
. We obtain the result above by substituting D ′ in the constraints on R and L and using the fact that h(h −1 (u) * q) is an increasing function in u for q ∈ [0, 1/2]. The converse follows from Mrs. Gerber's lemma [16] . For the more detailed proof, please see the extended version [15] .
The proof is based on the achievable scheme used in [7] which is a two-layered (superposition) scheme involving binning. Let J = (W 1 , W ′ ) and K = (W 2 , W ′′ ) be the indices associated with the chosen codewords U n (J) and V n (J, K) where W 1 and W 2 are bin indices sent to the decoder. With the appropriate size of codebook and bins, we can ensure that the joint typicality encoding and decoding are successful and that the sequences
) are jointly typical with high probability.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the leakage rate, we give a lemma which provides a bound on the n-letter conditional entropy based on properties of jointly typical sequences [16] . Then the privacy leakage averaged over all randomly chosen codebooks can be bounded as follows. , and from bounding the entropy terms H(Z n |J) and H(X n |J, K, Y n s , Z n ) using Lemma 2, (b) follows from defining P for the terms in a bracket and Fano's inequality H(W ′ , W ′′ |W 1 , W 2 , Y n , Y n s , Z n ) ≤ nǫ n which holds since given the codebook and W 1 , W 2 , Y n , the decoder can decode (W ′ , W ′′ ) with high probability, (c) follows from the codebook generation and a property similar to Lemma 2, and (d) follows from the definition of P and the Markov chain U − V − X − (Y, Y p , Y s , Z). For a more detailed proof, please see the extended version [15] .
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